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a b s t r a c t 
A great deal of monetary policy is aimed at steering market expectations but little is 
known about agents belief formation. This article investigates how US market participants 
adjust yield curve expectations in response to two shocks related to monetary policy. The 
results show that in the aggregate, market participants initially underreact to changes in 
monetary policy. This implies that news are not fully absorbed, which potentially impedes 
a smooth monetary policy transmission. We further show that these information rigidities 
could be driven by a lack of information diffusion among individual forecasters. Last, we 
find that depending on the source of the shock and the maturities of the yields, underre- 
action is followed by a period of overcompensation a pattern called delayed overshooting. 
Knowing this allows the central bank to better calibrate their actions in the first place, 
which could pave the way for more optimal monetary policy. 
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license 







Since the outbreak of the global financial crisis, central banks have increased their effort s to communicate policy deci- 
sions to the public. Communication can be regarded as a necessary tool to ensure a smooth monetary policy transmission or
– by steering market expectations – even as an own-standing pillar of monetary policy. Most of the structural models that 
guide monetary policy assume a particular form of belief formation, namely full information rational expectations (FIRE) 
( Muth, 1961 ). This implies that agents’ expectations are first on average not systematically biased and second that agents
collectively use all relevant information. In other words, central bankers can relatively easily steer market expectations since 
there area no rigidities that drive a wedge between the intended outcome of monetary policy and the realization in the
market. But how much evidence is there for the FIRE assumption and how do agents really adjust their beliefs? This paper
estimates how financial market participants adapt their interest rate expectations at different maturities to monetary policy 
news. 
There is a recent strand of the literature that empirically investigates belief formation of market agents. In a seminal 
paper and looking at inflation expectations, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) reject the FIRE assumption. Their results 
imply that agents initially underreact to news, which implies that too little weight is given to new information relative 
to FIRE. It can also be seen as a sort of information stickiness. Bordalo et al. (2020) corroborate this finding but point∗ Corresponding author. 
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out that using aggregate expectation data neglects the underlying belief formation process of individuals. Kucinskas and 
Peters (2019) and Angeletos et al. (2021) use a novel framework that allows not only to test whether FIRE holds but to esti-
mate the dynamics of belief formation. Kucinskas and Peters (2019) find that inflation expectations underreact to monetary 
policy shocks. Angeletos et al. (2021) look at the adjustment of inflation and unemployment expectations to two shocks, a 
main business cycle shock and a shock that accounts for most of the fluctuations in inflation. Consistent with Kucinskas and
Peters (2019) they find evidence for initial underreaction and hence sluggishness of belief updates. This underreaction, how- 
ever, is followed by a period where agents over-extrapolate their expectations. Angeletos et al. (2021) refer to this as delayed
overshooting . 
In this paper, we use a dynamic approach to investigate how financial markets adjust their beliefs / forecasts of different
segments of the yield curve in response to monetary policy shocks. We look at both a conventional monetary policy shock,
which is characterized by a change in interest rates, as well as an information shock. The latter reflects the central bank’s
assessment about the economic outlook and arises due to information asymmetries between the public and the central 
bank. This has also been dubbed the information channel of monetary policy transmission ( Melosi, 2017 ) and several studies
advocate looking at both conventional monetary policy and news shocks jointly ( Cieslak and Schrimpf, 2019; Andrade and 
Ferroni, 2020; Jaroci ́nski and Karadi, 2020; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018 ). Since yield curve targeting has become the 
predominant monetary policy, how financial market participants adjust their yield curve expectations is of particular interest 
to the policymaker. We identify the monetary policy shocks using changes in high-frequency data before and after monetary 
policy announcements of the US Federal Reserve (Fed) following the approach of Jaroci ́nski and Karadi (2020) . To measure
market expectations, we use survey data from Blue Chip (BC) Financial Indicators, which is a survey of executives and 
experts from financial firms. Using the monetary policy and news surprises together with the survey data on expectations, 
we estimate a Bayesian proxy VAR in the spirit of Gertler and Karadi (2015) . Additionally, we perform static error-on-revision
regressions that utilize aggregate ( Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2015 ) as well as individual-level forecast data ( Bordalo et al.,
2020 ). This allows us to investigate one general potential source of imperfect expectations, namely the fact that market 
participants tend to neglect belief adjustments of their peers. 
Our main results can be summarized as follows: First and foremost, we find that market participants significantly under- 
react to both the conventional monetary policy shock and to the central bank information shock. This implies that agents 
respond sluggishly to new information, which is in violation of the FIRE assumption. Second, we find that the initial un-
derreaction of short term yields (up to two years) is followed by a period of overreaction in case of the monetary policy
shock. The same pattern, initial underreaction followed by overcompensation, can be observed for long-term yields (five 
to thirty years) in the case of the central bank information shock. This pattern is consistent with the delayed overshooting
hypothesis of Angeletos et al. (2021) . Evidence for delayed overshooting could imply that financial market players are at 
first inattentive or perceive signals as too noisy, before future outcomes become extrapolative or diagnostic in nature. Third 
and as an explanation for the initial underreaction, we examine individual expectations data. This shows that while market 
participants individually overreact to news, they are ignorant to belief adjustments from their peers, which in turn creates 
a form of information rigidity / stickiness on the aggregate level. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we provide an overview of relevant literature and
Section 3 describes the methodological framework to measure biases in expectations. Section 4 presents our econometric 
approach, in Section 5 we present the results while Section 6 offers robustness checks. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
2. Related Literature 
Our paper is related to two strands of the literature. First, the paper fits into a recent stream of literature investigating
the effect of central bank information shocks on monetary policy transmission. The importance of controlling for different 
information sets when analyzing monetary policy dates back to the introduction of the narrative monetary policy instru- 
ment by Romer and Romer (2004) . It is also widely discussed in the literature on high-frequency identification ( Kuttner,
2001; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2002; Gürkaynak et al., 2005 ). In a recent study, Jaroci ́nski and Karadi (2020) show that it is
of ample importance to separate conventional monetary policy shocks from information shocks in order to receive plausible 
results. Their identification strategy relies on a combination of high-frequency market surprises in federal funds futures and 
asset prices on the one hand and the use of sign restrictions on the other hand. More specifically, a pure monetary policy
shock should be accompanied by a negative correlation of interest rates (measured by surprises in federal funds futures) 
and stock market valuation. A positive comovement is indicative of a news shock that arises due to information asymme- 
tries between the central bank and the private sector ( Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018 ). The latter interprets an interest rate
increase as the central bank responding to a (future) economic boom, which is good news for the stock market. This is also
related to Delphic forward guidance in which the central bank intentionally steers market expectations ( Böck et al., 2021 ). 1 
Bauer and Swanson (2020) , however, question the existence of an information effect that runs from the Fed to the public.
They argue that both, central bank and the public, are responding to news but the former by more than the public expects.
Here, news of a strengthening economy causes both the Fed to raise interests rates and the private market to raise their ex-
pectations on the economy, which again results in a positive comovement of interest rates and asset prices. Another study 1 Andrade and Ferroni (2020) identify a Delphic forward guidance / information shock by a positive comovement of inflation and output expectations , 
which is again indicative for a future economic boom. 
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that tackles information asymmetries is the one by Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2020) . Their approach relies on construct- 
ing a measure of monetary policy that is purged from the central banks’ internal and markets’ forward-looking information. 
This instrument has been shown to be informationally robust with respect to the information set of the central bank and is
thus orthogonal to both central bank’s projections and to past market surprises. Similar results are found in the event-study 
analysis of Cieslak and Schrimpf (2019) , Caldara and Herbst (2019) , or Swanson (2021) . Nevertheless, none of these studies
look at the adjustment process of expectations in response to these shocks. 
Second, our paper is related to a number of studies that look at belief distortions in macroeconomics and finance. A
growing theoretical literature tries to explain why economic agents make systematic errors in adjusting their beliefs to 
news. There is a variety of reasons that the disclosure of new information is given too much or too little weight. For a
recent and excellent survey, see Manski (2018) . Studies investigating the FIRE assumption typically use survey data. Most of 
these studies show that FIRE does not hold empirically ( Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2015; Bordalo et al., 2020 ). Coibion and
Gorodnichenko (2015) provide evidence for a general underreaction in macroeconomic variables. Bordalo et al. (2020) cor- 
roborate this finding but only at the aggregate level. At the individual level, findings of Bordalo et al. (2020) provide evidence
for an overreaction of market participants’ beliefs to news. They explain the difference in aggregate and individual belief for- 
mation by the mechanism of diagnostic expectations ( Gennaioli et al., 2016 ). Angeletos et al. (2021) documents that in re-
sponse to business cycle fluctuations, expectations underreact initially but overshoot later on. By comparing the approaches 
of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) and Bordalo et al. (2020) , they find substantial evidence for delayed overshooting in
macroeconomic expectations. In the context of yield curve expectations, the study that is closest to ours is Wang (2019) . Re-
lying on the empirical framework of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) , Wang (2019) demonstrates that market participants 
underreact to news regarding the short-end of the yield curve and overreact at longer maturities. Our study differs from the
one of Wang (2019) since we first look at how market participants respond to monetary policy news and second we use the
novel approach of Kucinskas and Peters (2019) , which allows for a dynamic analysis of the expectation formation process. 
3. Biases in Expectation Formation 
We follow Kucinskas and Peters (2019) to measure biases in beliefs for some variable x t . The bias can be either positive
(underreaction) or negative (overreaction). In particular, underreaction defines the situation where the agent misjudges the 
impact of a shock to be smaller than it actually is. In other words, the adjustment of beliefs is too small, which results in
a positive bias. Conversely, if the agent reacts too strongly, we have a negative bias since the belief adjustments outweighs
the realized value, which is then called overreaction . 
Using these definitions, Kucinskas and Peters (2019) lay out a framework to empirically estimate the direction, the size, 
and the duration of a belief adjustment. In what follows, we briefly present their theoretical model for the case the time
series is driven by a single shock, but the extension to multiple shocks is straightforward. 2 Suppose that we observe a
macroeconomic time series x t and we remove any deterministic component (e.g., a stochastic or linear trend). Furthermore, 
we demean the process. Then this variable follows a linear stationary process 
x t = 
∞ ∑ 
 =0 
α ε t− (3.1) 
for some coefficients α with α0 = 1 and a martingale difference sequence of shocks ε t . This means that the expectation
with respect to the past is zero (more formally, E t [ ε t+1 ] = 0 ). In each period we observe that an agent makes an one-step
ahead forecast denoted by F t [ x t+1 ] . The forecasts are generated by the following linear stationary process 
F t [ x t+1 ] = b 0 + 
∞ ∑ 
 =0 
a  +1 ε t− . (3.2) 
In this setup, b 0 denotes a time-invariant bias, while the coefficients a  capture how subjective expectations react to past
shocks. From this representation it should be clear that if α  = a  , the subjective reaction to past shocks differs from the
reaction of the realized process. 
In case there is evidence of a systematic error in expectations, we have to define belief distortions by taking the difference
between the true conditional expectation and the subjective forecast. We denote this bias at time t as 
bias t = E t [ x t+1 ] − F t [ x t+1 ] 
= −b 0 −
∞ ∑ 
 =0 
b  ε t− , (3.3) 
where b  = sgn (α )(a  − α ) ,  ≥ 1 correspond to bias coefficients . The expectation process is unbiased if the subjective and
the objective forecast coincide, i.e., F t [ x t+1 ] = E t [ x t+1 ] . Further, an agent underreacts to a current shock ε t one period before
if | a 1 | < | α1 | , i.e., if the perceived response is smaller than the true response. Overreaction appears if b  is positive. In case
the bias coefficient is zero the expectation formation process is unbiased. 2 The general case with multiple shocks is found in Kucinskas and Peters (2019) , Section 2.1.2. 
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The main contribution of Kucinskas and Peters (2019) is that the bias coefficients can be directly inferred from the data
without knowing the true conditional expectation of the shocks. We denote the forecast error as the difference between 
the realized value and the subjective forecast, i.e., e t = x t − F t−1 [ x t ] . We know that x t = E t−1 [ x t ] + ε t and E t−1 [ ε t ] = 0 . This
implies 
e t = x t − F t−1 [ x t ] = −b 0 −
∞ ∑ 
 =0 
b  ε t− , (3.4) 
which is just the IRF of the forecast errors. Put differently, the bias (i.e., over- or underreaction) can be inferred by investigat-
ing the IRF of the forecast errors. In a multivariate time series framework the underlying fundamental economic shocks are 
not yet identified and hence not observed. In order to transform the model into its structural form, additional assumptions 
are needed. 
4. Econometric Framework 
In what follows, we describe the data and the empirical strategy. The latter consists of three building blocks: Identifica-
tion of monetary policy and central bank information shocks via high-frequency data ( Jaroci ́nski and Karadi, 2020 ), survey
data to construct forecasts errors, and a Bayesian proxy VAR in the spirit of Gertler and Karadi (2015) and Caldara and
Herbst (2019) to finally estimate belief distortions. 
4.1. Empirical Specification 
In this section, we shortly introduce the data, focusing on two variables that are key to our analysis, survey data on
forecasts and the high-frequency identified monetary policy shocks. We use monthly data spanning the period from February 
1990 to December 2016. The sample is constrained to the availability of the high-frequency monetary policy instruments. 
More in detail, we use the monthly average of the one-year (TB1Y) and ten-year constant-maturity Treasury yield (TB10Y) 
as short- and long-term interest rates, respectively. By using a rate longer than the targeted federal funds rate we also incor-
porate the impact of forward guidance. Hence, this rate remains a valid monetary policy instrument during the zero lower 
bound period ( Gertler and Karadi, 2015 ). To take a closer look at the yield curve, we further include data on three-months
(TB3M), six-months (TB6M), two-years (TB2Y), five-years (TB5Y), ten-years (TB10Y), and thirty-years (TB30Y) yields. To mea- 
sure stock prices, we take a monthly average of the S&P 50 0 (SP50 0) in log levels. Real activity and prices are measured
with real GDP (RGDP) and the GDP deflator (GDPDEF) in log levels. 3 To include an overall measure of financial conditions,
we use the excess bond premium (EBP, Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012; Favara et al., 2016 ). Due to the strong forward-looking
component of corporate spreads, the EBP adds important additional information to the information set of small scale VARs 
( Caldara and Herbst, 2019 ). More information on the construction of these variables is available in Table A1 in Appendix A .
Additionally, we include data on expectations using the Blue Chip Financial Indicators data base. The data were purchased 
and manually checked for errors. This survey consists of subjective expectations on various financial indicators 4 from ex- 
ecutives of financial firms. More specifically, in the survey, respondents are asked each month to form a prediction of the
average quarter-over-quarter change of various interest rates for the current quarter. To keep the notation simple, we denote 
expectations on yields with a superscript e , for instance TB1Y e for the expectation on the one-year Treasury bill. Hence,
forecast errors are denoted by TB1Y ̂ 
We will work with two main specifications. First, we estimate a VAR which closely follows the specification in 
Jaroci ́nski and Karadi (2020) augmented with expectations on the short- and long-end of the yield curve: 
y base line t = 
{
TB1Y , TB10Y , SP500 , RGDP , GDPDEF , EBP , TB1Y-TB1Y e , TB10Y-TB10Y e 
}
. 
In the second specification, we look more closely on the whole yield curve and extend this baseline model with interest
rate (expectations) of various maturities: 
y yiel dcur ve t = { TB3M , TB6M , TB1Y , TB2Y , TB5Y , TB10Y , TB30Y , SP500 , RGDP , GDPDEF , EBP , TB3M-TB3M e , 
TB6M-TB6M e , TB1Y-TB1Y e , TB2Y-TB2Y e , TB5Y-TB5Y e , 
TB10Y-TB10Y e , TB30Y-TB30Y e } . 
For the identification of the monetary policy and central bank information shocks we rely on high-frequency data. More 
specifically, we look at surprises (i.e., price changes) in the three-month Federal Funds futures and the S&P 500 measured 3 We directly use the replication data of Jaroci ́nski and Karadi (2020) who interpolate real GDP and the GDP deflator to monthly frequency following 
Stock and Watson (2010) . This implies to use the Kalman filter to interpolate the months in between by using a set of monthly variables closely related to 
economic activity and prices. 
4 Basically, the survey includes not only expectations of Treasury yields with different maturities, but also expectations on credit spreads and additional 
macroeconomic variables. All data used in this paper are described in Appendix A . 
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within an half-hour window around FOMC announcements. 5 The way the surprises are constructed, they measure solely the 
amount of new information released at an FOMC announcement. For instance, if an interest rate increase has already been 
fully anticipated in the markets, no change in the futures will be evident. A narrow time window around the announcements
ensures that no other structural shocks confound the surprise measures. We gather the surprise series in the following 
matrix, Z t = { hf _ MP , hf _ SP } where hf_MP refers to the monetary policy surprises while hf_SP refers to surprises in the stock
price. 
4.2. A Bayesian Proxy VAR 
Let { y t } T t=1 denote an M-dimensional time series process. A typical VAR(p) is written as 
y t = c + 
p ∑ 
j=1 
A j y t− j + u t , u t ∼ N M (0 , ) , (4.1) 
with c being a M × 1 intercept vector, A j denoting the M × M coefficient matrix of the jth lag and a Gaussian distributed
reduced-form error u t with full variance-covariance matrix . 
Transforming the model into its structural form yields 
A −1 0 y t = A −1 0 c + A −1 0 
p ∑ 
j=1 
A j y t− j + ε t , ε t ∼ N M (0 , I) , (4.2)
which corresponds to assume that A 0 A 
′ 
0 
=  holds. We follow the work of Gertler and Karadi (2015) to identify the causal
effects of the monetary policy and the central bank information shock. Let Z t denote the set of instruments specified before,
i.e., high-frequency surprises of monetary policy and stock prices. To be a valid instrument for the policy shock, Z t must be
correlated with the policy shock ε p t and orthogonal to all other shocks ε 
−p 
t , such that 
E 
[











= 0 . (4.3) 
While the first is the relevance assumption, the second states exogeneity. Relevance of the instruments is given because the 
proxies are actual movements of the policy indicators but purged from any endogenous reaction due to the high-frequency 
measurement. In particular, movements in the Fed Funds future indicate exogenous movements in the monetary policy 
actions of the central bank. However, stock price movements at FOMC announcements can be attributed to the release of 
information to the public from the central bank. Exogeneity is given because movements are only measured at the time 
of the FOMC announcement which constitutes a narrow time interval in which it is unlikely that another structural shock 
occurs. Hence, to identify the model we use the reduced-form errors of the TB1Y and SP500 as our policy indicators for the
two instruments. 
We proceed in three steps: First, we estimate the VAR given in Eq. (4.2) and extract the vector of reduced form errors,
u 
p 
t . Second, we regress u 
p 
t on the instrument Z t to isolate the exogenous variation in the reduced-form residual. Third and
similar to the second stage, in a two-stage least-squares procedure, we regress the remaining reduced form errors on the 
fitted values of ˆ u
p 
t . By using the variance-covariance matrix , we get an analytical solution to identify the elements in the
impact matrix A 0 , which enables us to trace out the structural response to the shocks under consideration. Derivation and
details can be found in Appendix C . 
Caldara and Herbst (2019) discuss a unified framework for a Bayesian proxy VAR in more detail. 6 For reduced-form 
estimation we use a standard Bayesian VAR similar to Giannone et al. (2015) . Concerning the prior choices we follow
Litterman (1986) , but also show that our results are robust to more sophisticated priors such as the Stochastic Search Vari-
able Selection (SSVS) prior ( George et al., 2008 ) or the Normal-Gamma (NG) prior ( Huber and Feldkircher, 2019 ). For the
details, we refer to Appendix B . 
5. Main Results 
In what follows, we provide results for two different specifications. First, we estimate the baseline model to get a first
impression of the effect of monetary policy on expectations on the short- and long-end of the yield curve. Second, we have
a closer look at additional segments of the yield curve. Third and last, we also analyze biases in expectation formation on a
disaggregated level. 5 To be precise, the window starts 10 min before and ends 20 min after the FOMC announcement ( Gürkaynak et al., 2005 ) and the data are provided in 
Jaroci ́nski and Karadi (2020) which covers around 240 FOMC announcements from 1990 to 2016. 
6 As an alternative to the proxy VAR one could have used the external instruments to compute effects by means of local projections ( Jordà, 2005 ) or 
added the instruments directly to the VAR ( Jaroci ́nski and Karadi, 2020 ). Basically, any of these approaches can be used since they all yield asymptotically 
the same IRFs up to a scaling factor as shown by Plagborg-Møller and Wolf (2021) . 
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Fig. 1. Monetary policy shock of the baseline VAR. Notes: Impulse response functions to a monetary policy shock, normalized to decrease the stock market 
index by 25 basis points. Black line denotes median response while gray shaded areas denote the 68% and 80% confidence intervals. Interest rates, spreads 
and forecast errors are in basis points, stock price index, real activity index and prices are in percent. 
Fig. 2. Central bank information shock of the baseline VAR. Notes: Impulse response functions to a central bank information shock, normalized to increase 
the stock market index by 25 basis points. Black line denotes median response while gray shaded areas denote the 68% and 80% confidence intervals. 






5.1. The Baseline VAR 
The specification of the baseline VAR is closely related to the one by Jaroci ́nski and Karadi (2020) . Additionally, we
include interest rate expectations to analyze belief adjustments. The model is specified as in Section 4.1 using the variables
in vector y baseline t . The VAR features p = 12 lags. We report results based on 10,0 0 0 draws where we discard the first 5,0 0 0
as burn-ins. After the estimation of the model we further discard explosive draws leading to around 88% of stable draws.
Convergence of the sampler is achieved; for more details, see Table D1 in Appendix D . The results are shown in Figs. 1 and 2 .
The first figure shows responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock, while the second one shows the corresponding 
responses to a positive central bank information shock. The figures show the posterior median along with 68% and 80% 892 


























credible intervals. To facilitate comparison, both shocks are scaled to either yield a 0.25% decrease (monetary policy shock) 
or increase (information shock) in equity prices (SP500). 
We first look at responses to the monetary policy shock and compare them to the existing literature (upper panel of
Fig. 1 ). There is an immediate increase of the one-year Treasury bill rate, while the ten-year Treasury bill rate responds pos-
itively only over the medium-term. Stock market prices, real activity, and the GDP deflator all decline. The effects on output 
and prices are rather persistent. Moreover, financial conditions, as measured by the excess bond premium, tighten. These re- 
sults are in line with theoretical predictions of a New-Keynesian (NK) model with financial accelerator (e.g., Bernanke et al.,
1999 ) as well as within the ballpark of estimates of other recent studies. For instance, Swanson (2021) or Andrade and Fer-
roni (2020) find similar effects for interest rates of varying maturities in regression-based analysis utilising high-frequency 
surprises in FOMC statements. The sizable tightening of financial conditions, as measured by the excess bond premium, 
is further corroborated by Caldara and Herbst (2019) . Naturally, our findings are also in line with those of Jaroci ́nski and
Karadi (2020) . Interestingly, one minor difference of responses with respect to one-year yields arises. While the impact 
response is of similar magnitude (around 5 basis points), the dynamic behavior is different. Here, the response fades out 
after two years while it dissipates relatively quickly in Jaroci ́nski and Karadi (2020) . Hence, controlling for the responses
in expectations alters the dynamic shape of the response. The more persistent interest rate response could also indicate a 
more sluggish response of the market to a monetary policy shock. This would be consistent with an underreaction in the
responses of the forecast errors, which we will discuss in more detail in the next paragraph. 
Next, we examine how financial market agents adjust their expectations in response to the monetary policy tightening. 
For that purpose, we look at the responses of the forecast errors (i.e., the bias coefficients introduced in Section 3 ) in one-
year Treasury bills (TB1Y-TB1Y e ) and ten-year Treasury bills (TB10Y-TB10Y e ). Considering the results depicted in Fig. 1 , most
of the adjustment takes place within the first five months and takes the form of a significant underreaction to the mone-
tary policy shock. 7 This holds true for both expectations of short-term and long-term yields. We also see that responses of
the bias coefficient tend to be more abrupt, whereas realized data responds more gradually. This implies that beliefs can 
adapt quickly. The pattern of adjustment we observe for one-year Treasury bills is consistent with the delayed overshooting 
hypothesis of Angeletos et al. (2021) : Agents first significantly underreact to the monetary policy shock, which triggers a 
period of overreaction to make up for their initial underreaction. The observed initial underreaction could be explained by 
either a certain degree of inattention or more generally by noisy / sticky information. In general, the adjustment is more
complex for long-term yields. In line with short-term yields, there is an initial period of underreaction but then beliefs tend
to switch between over- and underrecation until they finally level out. This more complex pattern could be due to the fact
that long-term yields are not only driven by movements in short-rates, but also depend on macroeconomic fundamentals 
(e.g., Diebold and Li, 2006 , long-run inflation expectations) as well as expected interest rates. Taken at face value, our find-
ings demonstrate that belief adjustments for one-year government bond yields follow the delayed overshooting pattern of 
Angeletos et al. (2021) , whereas belief adjustments for long-term yields are more complex. Both responses, however, show 
that expectations are not immediately aligned with the policy of the central bank, which can impeded monetary policy 
transmission. 
Next, we examine results in response to a central bank information shock. Impulse responses are shown in Fig. 2 . Here,
we see a positive reaction of the stock market, real activity, and an easing of financial conditions. Again, these results are
very close to those provided in Jaroci ́nski and Karadi (2020) as well as event-studies such as Cieslak and Schrimpf (2019) ,
Andrade and Ferroni (2020) , and Swanson (2021) . In contrast to responses to the monetary policy shock, long-term rates
increase on impact, which could be driven by the upward response of inflation. Again, we observe a somewhat distinct 
response of short-term interest rates / one-year government bond yields compared to the one reported in Jaroci ́nski and
Karadi (2020) : Controlling for the response of expectations to the information shock renders the response of short-term 
interest rates insignificant while it is significantly positive in Jaroci ́nski and Karadi (2020) . This comes as no surprise, since
we control for expectations in the VAR and the propagation channel of the information shock runs entirely through expec- 
tations. This is also in line with Bauer and Swanson (2020) , who advocate that both agents and the central bank are just
responding to economic news. Looking at the adjustment of expectations reveals an immediate underreaction as well as a 
long-term convergence of the bias coefficient towards zero. By contrast, the pattern for long-term yields is again consistent 
with the delayed overshooting hypothesis of Angeletos et al. (2021) : initial underreaction followed by significant overcom- 
pensation, even in the long-run. 
Again, the motives that lie behind the initial underreaction can be manifold, and we will analyze this in Section 5.3 in
more detail. In the context of the central bank information shock, however, there is another potential explanation which 
relates to a large body of literature on forward guidance ( Melosi, 2017 ). In that literature, structural models often yield
implausibly large effects of forward guidance on output and inflation, a phenomenon called the forward guidance puzzle. 
Introducing a level of inattention (i.e., underreaction) of market participants is a remedy to that puzzle and renders pre- 
dictions of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models more reliable ( Christoffel et al., 2020 ). Hence, the underreaction 
we see could be explained by agents’ inattention. Our results provide not only an estimate of inattention but also the time
profile of adjustment which could further guide the development of theoretical models in the context of forward guidance. 7 Note that the response of the forecast error on impact solely resembles the effect of the shock the respective variable. This is by construction; expec- 
tations cannot adjust at the same time they are formed. 
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Fig. 3. Monetary policy shock of the yield curve VAR. Notes: Impulse response functions to a monetary policy shock, normalized to decrease the stock 
market index by 25 basis points. Black line denotes median response while gray shaded areas denote the 68% and 80% confidence intervals. All units are 






















Summing up, we find that short-term yields in the context of a monetary policy shock adjust consistent with the delayed
overshooting hypothesis of Angeletos et al. (2021) – that is agents respond with an initial under- followed by an overreac-
tion. The same holds true for long-term yields in the context of a central bank information shock. Central banks have to take
this initial period of sluggish adjustment to changes in the monetary policy stance / news into account in order to ensure
a smooth transmission of their policy. The next section analyzes in more detail which role for this pattern the maturity
structure plays. 
5.2. A Closer Look at the Yield Curve 
In this section, we extend the baseline model to include yields with different maturities to get a fuller picture of belief
adjustments along the yield curve. This extended VAR features only p = 2 lags. Again, we report results based on 10,0 0 0
draws where we discard the first 5,0 0 0 as burn-ins and discard explosive draws leaving us with around 73% stable draws.
Convergence diagnostics can be found in Appendix D . We use the vector y 
yieldcurv e 
t defined in Section 4 . In particular, we
include the 3-months (TB3M), 6-months (TB6M), 1-year (TB1Y), 2-year (TB2Y), 5-year (TB5Y), 10-year (TB10Y), and 30- 
year (TB30Y) Treasury yields along with respective forecast errors. For the sake of brevity, we only report the IRFs of the
yields and the respective forecast errors for both shocks. Fig. 3 shows the responses of a monetary policy tightening, while
Fig. 4 shows the responses of a positive central bank information shock. Both shocks are scaled in terms of the S&P500, in
particular to a 0.25% decrease and increase, respectively. 
A conventional monetary policy shock is expected to move the yield curve mostly on the short-end and to a lesser extent
on the long-end. The results depicted in Fig. 3 indeed show a more front-loaded response with yields up to two years
reacting most strongly. The reaction of yields on the very long-end, in particular the 10-year and 30-year maturity yields, is
below 1 basis points and far less pronounced as on the short-end. Looking at the adjustment process of expectations, the
following results emerge: First and after the initial shock, expectations of all yields along the yield curve respond with an
underreaction up to five months, after which expectations revert and overreact. At the short end, market participants adapt 
their expectations within ten months after which the bias coefficient is no longer significant. Hence, yields with maturities 
from three months to two years again follow the delayed overshooting behavior ( Angeletos et al., 2021 ). For the middle- and
long-end of the curve, the bias coefficient takes considerably longer to fade out, namely between fifteen to twenty months. 
Also, the pattern of belief adjustments is generally more complex. These results corroborate the findings of our baseline 
model. 
Finally, we investigate responses to the central bank information shock, shown in Fig. 4 . News and information shocks
are often regarded as a form of forward guidance shock, which should mainly impact the middle segment of the yield
curve. 8 Considering peak effects of the responses for different maturities indeed indicate stronger effects in the 3-months 
to two-years segment. Effects are significantly smaller for the longer end of the curve. Yields at the very long-end of the8 Rogers et al. (2014) , indicate that forward guidance does typically not affect yields with larger maturity as five years; Brand et al. (2010) reports a 
hump-shaped maturity response pattern of euro area yields to communication. Altavilla et al. (2019) using high-frequency identification show that forward 
guidance affects yields with a maturity over two years most strongly. 
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Fig. 4. Central bank information shock of the yield curve VAR. Notes: Impulse response functions to a central bank information shock, normalized to 
increase the stock market index by 25 basis points on impact. Black line denotes median response while gray shaded areas denote the 68% and 80% 
confidence intervals. All units are in basis points. 
Table 1 
Error-on-revision regression results. 
Consensus Individual 
β1 SE Obs. β
p 
1 
SE Obs. med (β i 1 ) med ( Obs. ) I
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
TB3M 0.22 0.12 321 −0 . 32 0.01 14,613 −0 . 27 39.5 216 
TB6M 0.38 0.12 321 −0 . 25 0.01 12,706 −0 . 18 35.5 200 
TB1Y 0.43 0.12 321 −0 . 23 0.01 12,993 −0 . 15 35.0 204 
TB2Y 0.47 0.10 321 −0 . 20 0.01 14,796 −0 . 13 40.0 215 
TB5Y 0.44 0.11 321 −0 . 21 0.01 14,719 −0 . 14 39.0 216 
TB10Y 0.34 0.10 321 −0 . 24 0.01 15,034 −0 . 14 39.0 217 
TB30Y 0.33 0.11 321 −0 . 28 0.01 13,999 −0 . 20 35.5 216 
Notes: This table shows coefficients from forecast error on forecast revision regression. Column 1 to 6 show the coefficients of consensus time series regres- 
sions and individual-level pooled panel regressions together with standard errors (SE) and number of observations (Obs.). Column 7–9 shows the median 
coefficients, median number of observations and number of forecasters ( I) in forecaster-by-forecaster regressions. For consensus time series regressions and 











yield curve show an even negative reaction after about a year, indicating a compression of the yield curve. Together with
the positive reaction on the stock market index (not shown), this behavior is consistent with a positive news shock about
the economic outlook. The latter is typically accompanied by a rise in inflation, which could trigger the upward shift in the
term structure. When looking at the adjustment paths of expectations, we find that at the short-end, after the shock hits,
market participants underreact to the news before the bias fades out. This adjustment takes place within the first 10 months
after the shock. For longer term yields, we again find evidence for delayed overshooting: Here, underreaction is followed by 
overreaction and with about 20 months, the adjustment bias needs considerably longer to fade out. 
5.3. A Disaggregated View 
The results from the previous sections indicate an initial underreaction of the aggregated expectations. In this section, we 
look at one explanation for this underreaction, namely the relationship between individual and aggregate expectations data. 
More specifically, Bordalo et al. (2020) suggest to look at individual data and find that agents systematically overcorrect 
their own historical belief errors while being ignorant to adjustments of other market participants. This behavior in turn 
leads to a rigidity in the aggregate / consensus forecast since information is not fully diffused. 
In what follows, we run static error-on-revision regressions in the spirit of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) and more 
recently used in Bordalo et al. (2020) . The individual forecast data is also from the BC survey, which asks each month 40–50
individual financial executives to provide an interest rate forecast for the current quarter. In total, we use data on about
200 separate individuals with varying sample lengths due to a change in the composition of forecasters in the survey. For
a typical forecaster, we observe a median sample length of 35–40 observations (see Column 8 in Table 1 ). Note that this
exercise will not tell us how beliefs adjust to monetary policy news. Rather, the results will allow us to assess whether895 



















expectations of other market participants in general play a role in forming the aggregate / consensus belief on interest rate
expectations and how mistakes in the past shape individual belief formation. 
We denote by F t [ x t+1 ] the one-step ahead consensus forecast made at time t for the future value of x t+1 of an in-




t [ x t+1 ] , where F 
i 
t [ x t+1 ]
is the forecast of individual i and I > 1 is the number of forecasters. Then we can define the forecast revision at t with
F R t = F t [ x t+1 ] − F t−1 [ x t+1 ] where F t−1 [ x t+1 ] refers to the forecast in the previous period. Predictability of forecast errors is
measured by estimating the following regression 
x t+1 − F t [ x t+1 ] = β0 + β1 FR t + ηt+1 , ηt+1 ∼ N (0 , σ 2 η ) . (5.1) 
If forecast errors are not predictable from forecast revisions, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of FIRE. This essentially 
reduces to testing whether β1 = 0 . Otherwise, overreaction (underreaction) is implied by a negative (positive) coefficient β1 . 
For instance, a positive coefficient β1 together with a positive forecast revision, FR t > 0 , implies that the consensus forecast
is not optimistic enough. Bordalo et al. (2020) extend this analysis by also analyzing forecast error predictability at the 
individual level. By using individual forecast revisions F R i t = F i t [ x t+1 ] − F i t−1 [ x t+1 ] and forecast errors, they pursue estimating
a pooled panel regression model, 
x t+1 − F i t [ x t+1 ] = β p 0 + β p 1 FR i t + ηp t+1 , ηp t+1 ∼ N (0 , σ 2 p,η ) . (5.2) 
The common coefficient β p 
1 
indicates whether the average forecaster under- or overreacts to their own information. If β p 
1 
= 
0 , this implies rational expectations. Last, we also run forecaster-by-forecaster regressions, 
x t+1 − F i t [ x t+1 ] = β i 0 + β i 1 FR i t + ν i t+1 , ν i t+1 ∼ N (0 , σ 2 i,ν ) , i = 1 , . . . , I. (5.3)
This yields a distribution of individual coefficients β i 
1 
, i = 1 , . . . , I where we look at the median coefficient. Since this can
result in varying sample sizes for the estimation (due to the different lengths of different forecasters in the sample), we
keep forecasters only with at least fifteen observations. Furthermore, we winsorize outliers. 9 
Results of the error-on-revision regressions are presented in Table 1 . We report point estimates and standard errors. 
For all interest rates, the null of FIRE can be rejected. The standard errors are Newey–West with the automatic bandwidth
selection ( Newey and West, 1994 ). Column 1 reports coefficients from the consensus regression. All of them are signifi-
cantly different from zero. Throughout the regressions, β1 > 0 indicates underreaction. This is consistent with the findings 
in the previous sections. Turning now to the results of the individual-level regressions provided in columns 4 and 7, we
see a broad-based evidence for overreaction. More specifically, the pooled panel coefficient β p 
1 
and the median coefficient 
med (β i 
1 
) are consistently negative. The panel coefficient is statistically significant. The median coefficient med (β i 
1 
) is, on 
average, slightly less pronounced than the pooled coefficient. Hence, both error-on-revision regression results point to over- 
reaction in interest rates. These findings are similar to the one presented in Bordalo et al. (2020) . 10 
What do these results imply for our analysis on yield curve expectations? In the previous section we provided evidence 
that belief formation of yield curve data shows strong initial underreaction to monetary policy shocks. Using the static ap- 
proach of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) corroborates that the consensus expectation formation of market participants 
underreact to news – irrespective of whether these news are related to monetary policy or not. On top of that, this anal-
ysis reveals evidence for an overreaction in the individual-level error-on-revision regressions ( Bordalo et al., 2020 ). Since 
forecasters overreact to their own information relative to a rational benchmark, they concurrently do not react to all the in-
formation received by others. Agents simply do not observe the reactions of their peers – or ignore them – which creates a
rigidity / stickiness in the consensus forecast. Information diffuses slowly and it takes time until overreaction is also evident 
in the aggregate. This pattern is consistent with the IRF analysis using aggregate data from the previous sections. It also fits
nicely with the explanation of the delayed overshooting hypothesis provided in Angeletos et al. (2021) . In particular, they
find evidence of a combination of informational frictions and over-extrapolation. 
6. Robustness AAnalysis 
In this section, we perform sensitivity checks along several dimensions. First, we vary the lag length, second, we choose 
different Bayesian prior setups and third, we use alternative variables in the VAR specification. Last, we re-estimate the 
model with stochastic volatility in the error variances to control for possible heteroscedasticity. 11 9 We follow here the approach taken by Bordalo et al. (2020) . They exclude forecasts which are five interquartile ranges away from the median. In case 
there is no variation in the interquartile range, we apply the interquartile range of the previous period. This ensures consistency of the forecasts. 
10 Differences in the exact size of the coefficients accrue to slightly different samples and the chosen forecast horizon. Bordalo et al. (2020) estimates 
coefficients for horizon h = 3 . 
11 More precisely, we rewrite the VAR in its Cholesky form as shown in Carriero et al. (2019) and implement stochastic volatility following Kastner and 
Frühwirth-Schnatter (2014) . 
896 
M. Boeck and M. Feldkircher Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 191 (2021) 887–901 
Fig. 5. Impulse response functions for sensitivity checks. Notes: Upper panel denotes the responses to a monetary policy shock, normalized to a decrease 
of the stock market index by 25 basis points. Lower panel denotes the responses to a central bank information shock, normalized to an increase of the 
stock market index by 25 basis points. Lines together with shaded areas denote median with 80% confidence bounds. Black line together with dark-gray 
shaded area denotes the model in Section 5.2 while gray dashed line together with light-gray shaded area denotes median of all models with a different 








As is standard when working with monthly data, we use p = 12 in the baseline model. This rather long lag length comes
with the drawback that the parameter space increases quite drastically. Hence, we decided to use p = 2 for the yield curve
VAR due the high-dimensionality of the model. We opt for two sensitivity checks here. First, we use different variants of
Bayesian shrinkage priors, all utilizing the idea to either shrink non-important coefficients to zero or to penalize higher- 
order lags stronger. Hence, it comes as no surprise that information criteria as the well-known Schwarz criterion point to 
our preferred lag length since non-important coefficients are shrunk towards zero and do not introduce additional noise. 
When controlling for heteroscedasticity the results are almost unchanged and qualitatively similar to our baseline results. 
The sensitivity checks are performed for the model outlined in Section 5.2 for p = { 1 , 2 , . . . , 12 } lags, and with and without
stochastic volatility. This results in a total of 24 alternative specifications. After the estimation, identification, and calculating 
the IRFs for each model, we compute the median response of all these models. This median response is depicted in Fig. 5
with the gray dashed line together with the light-gray confidence bounds (the median of the 10/90th quantile of all models).
For better comparison, we have also included the results obtained in Section 5.2 . For both identified shocks, results do
not change significantly across specifications considered. The findings concerning the adjustment process of expectations 897 













discussed before still hold. It rather seems that some responses are amplified, which is driven by the stochastic volatility 
specification (not explicitly shown). 
Furthermore, we also experimented with different settings of variables. In particular, we have replaced the interpolated 
monthly real GDP series with industrial production, a commonly used real activity indicator when doing analyses on this 
frequency, and used the consumer price index instead of the GDP deflator. Again, our results do not change qualitatively. 
We also reduced model complexity for the model used in Section 5.2 by replacing yields by the three Nelson–Siegel factors
that are frequently used to summarize the yield curve ( Nelson and Siegel, 1987; Diebold and Li, 2006 ): the level factor ( β0 ),
the slope factor ( β1 ), and the curvature factor ( β2 ) along with the respective forecast errors of the three factors ( β0 − βe 0 ,
β1 − βe 1 and β2 − βe 2 ). The results show reactions similar to the ones obtained by our baseline specification. More specifically, 
the adjustment process for the monetary policy shock takes up to twenty months for the level factor, while it only takes up
to eight months for the slope factor. When looking at the information shock, adjustment takes longer for the three factors
but there may be countervailing forces at work. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we investigate how US financial market participants adjust their interest rate expectations in response to 
monetary policy shocks. As a measure of belief distortions, we consider the difference of realized and aggregate survey based 
expectations of different segments of the US term structure. Employing the recently proposed framework of Kucinskas and 
Peters (2019) allows us to provide dynamic estimates of the bias coefficients which resembles adjustments in beliefs. To 
cross-check our findings, we also apply the error-on-revision regression framework of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) us- 
ing individual forecast data. 
Our main results can be summarized as follows: First and foremost, we find that market participants significantly un- 
derreact to both a conventional monetary policy shock and to a central bank information shock. This implies that agents 
respond sluggishly to new information, which is in violation of the FIRE assumption and could impede a smooth trans- 
mission of monetary policy. Our estimates further suggest that it takes between one (short maturities) and two (long ma- 
turities) years until news are fully absorbed. Policies aimed at the longer end of the yield curve hence do take a consid-
erable time until market expectations and monetary policies are aligned and policymakers should be aware of this fact. 
Second, we find that the initial underreaction of short term yields (up to two years) is followed by a period of overreac-
tion in case of the monetary policy shock. The same pattern, initial underreaction followed by overcompensation, can be 
observed for long-term yields (five to thirty years) in the case of the central bank information shock. These patterns are
consistent with the delayed overshooting hypothesis of Angeletos et al. (2021) and could imply that financial market play- 
ers are at first inattentive or perceive signals as too noisy, before future outcomes become extrapolative or diagnostic in 
nature. Last, we use individual data to provide a one further explanation for the initial underreaction. Using the frame- 
work of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) we find that while market participants individually overreact to news, they are 
ignorant to belief adjustments from their peers. This in turn creates a form of information rigidity at the aggregate level
( Bordalo et al., 2020 ). 
Our main results of strong initial underreaction to monetary policy news and in some instances the distinct pattern of 
delayed overshooting bear important policy implications. In order to counteract the initial information rigidity, central banks 
can resort to two strategies. First, a strong commitment to the current monetary policy stance can reduce the amount of
uncertainty ( Adam and Woodford, 2012 ). Agents are permanently learning a central banks’ monetary policy rule, and have 
to re-learn it in case of policy shifts. Second, the initial underreaction can be counteracted by resorting to a leaning against
the wind strategy. If the central bank tightens monetary policy stronger than necessary at first and relaxes it afterwards, it
mirrors the responses in expectations due to delayed overshooting. This can then lead to more optimal monetary policy and 
hence welfare improvements ( Angeletos and Lao, 2020 ). 
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Table A1 
Data labels and sources. 
FRED 
RGDP Real Gross Domestic Product 
INDPRO Industrial Production 
GDPDEF Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator 
CPIAUCSL Consumer prices 
SP500 S&P500 
TB3M 3-Month Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 
TB6M 6-Month Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 
TB1Y 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 
TB2Y 2-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 
TB5Y 5-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 
TB10Y 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 
TB30Y 30-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 
Blue Chip Financial Indicators 
TB3M e Expectation on 3-Month Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 
TB6M e Expectation on 6-Month Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 
TB1Y e Expectation on 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 
TB2Y e Expectation on 2-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 
TB5Y e Expectation on 5-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 
TB10Y e Expectation on 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 
TB30Y e Expectation on 30-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 
Miscellaneous 
EBP Excess bond premium ( Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012 ) 
FF4HF Surprises in the 3-month Fed Funds futures ( Jaroci ́nski and Karadi, 2020 ) 









Appendix B. Bayesian Vector Autoregression 
We estimate the reduced-form VAR(p) within a Bayesian framework. The law of motion of the M-dimensional vector y t 
reads 
y t = c + 
p ∑ 
j=1 
A j y t− j + u t , u t ∼ N (0 , ) , (B.1) 
where A j ( j = 1 , . . . , p) is the M × M coefficient matrix, c denotes the M × 1 vector of constants and  is the M × M covari-
ance matrix. To speed up computation, we use a simple factorization following Carriero et al. (2019) . The factorization is
applied to the covariance matrix  and reads as follows 
 = L −1 DL −1 ′ , (B.2) 
where L −1 is a lower-triangular matrix with ones on the main diagonal and D is a diagonal matrix containing the volatili-
ties. This allows us to estimate the vector autoregression equation-by-equation. We purse a Bayesian approach to estimation, 
because it allows to introduce a priori information to the model. Issues arising when estimating time series models like the
small-sample bias and initial value dependence can thus be at least alleviated. Furthermore, Bayesian methods allow for 
regularization since VAR models are quite heavily parameterized. In the Bayesian paradigm, we have to elicit prior distribu- 
tions over the parameters. Hence, we stack all coefficients in β = vec 
(
(A ′ 1 , . . . , A ′ p , c ′ ) ′ 
)
and use the well-known Minnesota 
prior setup ( Doan et al., 1984 ) 
β| λ1 , λ2 ∼ N (b, V ) . (B.3) 
Most macroeconomic time series seem to be characterized by a unit root ( Litterman, 1986 ). We incorporate this prior belief
that each endogenous variable included in the model presents a unit root in its first lags, and coefficients equal to zero
for further lags and cross-variable lag coefficients. These translates into b being a vector of zeros except for the entries 
concerning the first own lag of each endogenous variable which are attributed values of 1. 
b = vec 
(
(I M , 0 , . . . , 0 ) 
′ ) (B.4) 
For the prior variance-covariance matrix V it is assumed that no covariance between coefficients exist, so that V is diagonal.
Also, Litterman (1986) argued that the higher the lag, the more confident we should be that coefficients linked to this lag
have a value of zero. Therefore, prior variance gets smaller for higher lags. In particular, we differentiate between setting 
the variance on the own endogenous lagged variable or on cross-variable lag coefficients and deterministics 
V = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ 














for i  = j and the k th lag , 
λ3 σ
2 for the deterministic part of the model, 
(B.5) i 
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In each case, the variance decreases with higher lag order. The hyperparameter λ1 governs the tightness on own lag coef- 
ficients, while λ2 governs the tightness on cross-variable lag coefficients. Furthermore, σi denotes the OLS error standard 
deviations obtained by estimating univariate autoregressive models of order p. The hyperparameter λ3 = 100 is for the de- 
terministic part of the model. Since λ1 and λ2 are crucial and might exert a powerful effect on the posterior estimates, 
we infer them from the data. Similar to Giannone et al. (2015) we specify Gamma priors on λs ∼ G (0 . 01 , 0 . 01) ( s = 1 , 2 ).
These Gamma priors are set to be weakly informative. This allows us to estimate the shrinkage parameters alongside the 
remaining coefficients of the model. 
For the remaining quantities in the model, standard priors are assumed. More precisely, the free elements of L −1 follow
a uninformative Gaussian distribution, i.e., [ L −1 ] i j ∼ N (0 , 10) ∀ i < j. The diagonal elements of D follow a Inverse-Gamma
distribution, i.e., [ D ] ii ∼ G (0 . 01 , 0 . 01) . For robustness analysis, we also use the SSVS prior ( George et al., 2008 ) and the NG
prior ( Huber and Feldkircher, 2019 ) providing both a different parametrization of Eq. (B.5) . For details we refer to the papers.
We briefly sketch the proposed Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. While the conditional posterior distri- 
butions of the coefficients and variances are available in closed-form and can be sampled from in a Gibbs step, we need
an Metropolis Hasting within Gibbs step for drawing from the posterior distribution of λs ( s = 1 , 2 ). We refer to Koop and
Korobilis (2010) as an excellent resource on the estimation of Bayesian multivariate time series models. 
Appendix C. Identification Based on External Instruments 
The identification scheme on external instruments is introduced by Mertens and Ravn (2013) and used by Gertler and 
Karadi (2015) to identify monetary policy shocks. Generally, it is similar to a two stage least squares procedure, where the
reduced form residuals of the structural shock are regressed on the instrument Z t . The fitted values are then regressed on
the other reduced form residuals, 
u −p t = β ˆ up t + νt , νt ∼ N(0 , σ 2 u ) . (C.1) 
Therefore, we get an estimate for the ratio β, which is the structural effect of a unit shock on the other variables in the




this by partitioning the matrix of the structural coefficients, such that 
A 0 = [ A p 0 A −p 0 ] = 
[
a 0 , 11 a 0 , 12 
a 0 , 21 a 0 , 22 
]
, (C.2) 
where the variable to be instrumented is arbitrarily chosen to be the first variable. Furthermore, a 0 , 11 is a scalar, a 
′ 
0 , 12 
and
a 0 , 21 are vectors of size M − 1 × 1 and a 0 , 22 is a matrix of size M − 1 × M − 1 . Furthermore, we partition the reduced form








Then a 0 , 11 is identified up to a sign convention and is obtained by the following closed form solution 
(A p 
0 
) 2 = a 2 0 , 11 = 
11 − a 0 , 12 a ′ 0 , 12 , (C.4) 
where 
a 0 , 12 a 
′ 
0 , 12 = (21 − β11 ) ′ Q −1 (21 − β11 ) , (C.5) 
with 
Q = β11 β′ − (21 β′ + β′ 21 ) + 22 . (C.6) 
Appendix D. Convergence Diagnostics 
In this section, we evaluate convergence of the sampler laid out in Appendix B . To proceed, we look at three different
convergence diagnostics. In an ideal setting, the sampler returns independent draws. The stronger the autocorrelation in the 
sampler, the more draws are needed. To evaluate the extent of autocorrelation in the chain, we use three different statistics.
First, we compute inefficiency factors telling us how much draws we need for drawing one identically and independently 
distributed draw. Second, we have a look at the Raftery and Lewis’s diagnostic statistic ( Raftery and Lewis, 1992 ). It is also
a measure of autocorrelation and returns an dependence factor which should not exceed 5 in the ideal setting. Third, we
look at Geweke’s convergence diagnostic ( Geweke et al., 1991 ). This is a test of equality of the means of the first 10% and
last 50% of the MCMC chain. We report the share of Z-scores exceeding the critical value of 1.96. 
For both models, convergence is achieved. Only for the hyperparameters λs ( s = 1 , 2 ) higher inefficiency factors and de-
pendence factors are observed. This comes as no surprise since they are not drawn from a closed-form conditional posterior 
distribution, but with the help of Metropolis–Hasting simulation techniques which usually result in higher autocorrelation 
of the sampler. Nevertheless, the problem is not severe due to the high number of draws generated for both models. Both
models are based on 10,0 0 0 posterior draws where we discard the first 5,0 0 0 as burn-ins. Furthermore, we discard all
explosive draws (defined as the maximum eigenvalue of the companion matrix exceeds unity in absolute terms). 900 
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Table D1 
Convergence statistics. 
β  L −1 D λ1 λ2 # Draws 
Baseline Model 4,341 
Inefficiency Factor 1.06 1.07 1.01 1.74 16.47 39.57 
Dependence Factor 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.06 10.00 11.90 
Geweke’s Z-scores 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Yield Curve Model 3,506 
Inefficiency Factor 1.03 1.03 1.01 1.26 4.90 12.40 
Dependence Factor 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.04 4.48 6.52 
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